The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence: more progress needed
About the report The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative is the main scheme for mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats and risks from outside the EU. Although these risks are low, there are signs that they are on rise and, if they were to materialise, their impact on the global health, environment and economy could be high. This Initiative aims to strengthen partner countries' capabilities through capacity-building projects and a network for cooperation. We examined whether the EU CBRN Initiative had mitigated the CBRN threat, concluding that it did but that many challenges remain. We make a number of recommendations for improving the Initiative.
Executive summary
ISince 2010 the EU has sought to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks from beyond its borders through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative (“the Initiative”). It is the EU’s largest civilian external security programme and is financed through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace with a budget of €130 million for the years 2014-2020. The Initiative is one of the main tools1 to mitigate CBRN threats and risks from outside the EU.
IIIn order to assess the extent to which the Initiative contributed to mitigating CBRN risks from outside the EU, we looked at the risk management approach, the Initiative’s implementation in partner countries and the monitoring and evaluation systems. During this exercise we followed up the recommendations made in ECA special report 17/2014 (“Can the EU’s Centres of Excellence Initiative contribute effectively to mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks from outside the EU?”), which dealt with the set-up of the scheme.
IIIWe conclude that the Initiative has contributed to mitigating these CBRN threats, but that many challenges remain. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have fully implemented three out of six of the recommendations, contained in our earlier special report 17/2014, and partially implemented two of them. Partner countries are now more involved in the initiation and implementation of projects, the organization at regional level has been strengthened and cooperation between decision-makers and implementing bodies has improved. While some progress has been made, the role of the EU delegations and the speed of project implementation are still not satisfactory. One of our earlier recommendation which proposed to concentrate EU funding in the areas most relevant to EU security and was accepted by the Commission has not been implemented.
IVAn adequate risk management approach to the activities of the Initiative has not yet been developed for the Initiative as a whole, at the project selection stage and for the identification of partner countries’ needs.
VThe Commission provides partner countries with tools and a methodology to help them assess their own needs and develop national action plans to mitigate CBRN risks. However, not sufficient guidance is given as how risks should be identified and prioritised. Despite this drawback, the needs assessment questionnaire and national action plans are still key elements that underpin the Initiative. However, the Commission cannot respond quickly enough to all partner countries’ requests for assistance in identifying and prioritising their needs; this risks to seriously delay the preparation of both the questionnaires and the action plans.
VIA number of aspects of the Initiative have been developed in partner countries in addition to the improvements resulting from our previous recommendations. The Initiative has promoted a culture of safety and cooperation. CBRN national teams have been appointed in the majority of the partner countries. Projects have delivered most of their outputs; stakeholders have especially valued operational capacity-building exercises.
VIIRegional cooperation has been initiated but it is still lacking as partner countries do not have sufficient interaction and wish to address their national needs first.
VIIISince our earlier special report 17/2014, the EU delegations’ involvement has improved. However, the EU delegations were insufficiently active in promoting the Initiative and mobilising political will. CBRN was not systematically included in the policy, security or political dialogue. Interaction between the Commission’s Directorates-General and with the donor community, particularly on the question of the potential funding available, was limited.
IXThe lack of clear objectives, relevant indicators and data collected on the ground impaired the assessment of the outcome and impact of projects and the Initiative as a whole.
XThe CBRN web-based portal has considerable potential as an operational database for the implementation and management of the Initiative’s activities, but is not yet an effective, complete, up to date and structured repository of activities, lessons learned and best practices.
XIWe therefore recommend that the Commission and the EEAS:
- prioritise activities on the basis of a systemic risk assessment;
- strengthen the Initiative’s regional dimension;
- further strengthen the EU delegations’ role in the Initiative;
- identify potential synergies and other available funding sources;
- increase accountability and visibility of activities and results through improved monitoring and evaluation;
- overhaul the web-based portal to allow easy access to all the information concerning the Initiative’s activities.
Introduction
01Episodes such as the recent use of sarin and chlorine gas in Iraq and Syria and of the nerve agent VX at Kuala Lumpur airport in February 2017, the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014-2016 and the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdown in 2011 are stark reminders of the dangers that can ensue when chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks occur. Whether released accidentally or deliberately, chemical agents, pandemic and epizootic biological diseases, and radiological and nuclear substances can pose significant threats to global health, the environment and the economy.
02The probability of CBRN risks materialising is considered low by the Commission, but the impact of an occurrence can be high2. While most of the international community has signed international treaties and conventions3 regulating the use of CBRN weapons and materials, a number of states have not implemented them, and others have yet to ratify the agreements. The acquisition and malevolent use of CBRN components takes place, and the threat is expected to grow in the coming years4. In addition to the malevolent use of CBRN substances, natural and man-made accidents may occur.
03At the EU level, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) coordinates the EU’s domestic CBRN policy5 to mitigate the associated threats and risks. As CBRN threats know no borders the EU cannot confine its actions to the EU area. Indeed, the European Council, the Council of the European Union6 and the European Parliament7 have repeatedly stressed the importance of linking the EU’s internal and external security policies, which cover CBRN matters. The European Commission has also stated that “EU external action must reflect, complement and contribute to EU’s internal security”8. The growing support for the security sectors is backed by the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy9.
04The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative (“the Initiative”), managed by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), is the main but not the only scheme for mitigating CBRN threats from outside the EU. DG DEVCO carries out other mitigating actions which include the reinforcement of export control systems in dual-use items (CBRN material with both civilian and military applications) and the reorientation of scientists having dual-use technology knowledge.
05The Initiative’s main objective is to strengthen the long-term capacity of, and to foster long lasting cooperation among the national and regional authorities, and administrative bodies responsible for tackling CBRN threats10. The Initiative mainly finances capacity building projects but the benefits are not limited to projects. Its main feature is to establish and consolidate CBRN networks (or Centres of Excellence) of cooperation between and within partner countries. The network is organised around regional secretariats where knowledge and expertise is shared.
06The Initiative is the single largest action, in financial terms, under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)11 and the biggest EU civilian external security programme. The IcSP addresses conflict, peace and security “issues that cannot be effectively tackled under other EU cooperation instruments”12.
07The budget for the Initiative was €109 million for the 2009-2013 period and €130 million for 2014-2020. This means that the yearly average fell from €22 million to €19 million between the two periods (see Annex I).
08The Initiative was launched in May 201013. We examined its set-up in special report 17/2014: “Can the EU’s Centres of Excellence initiative contribute effectively to mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks from outside the EU?” We concluded that it could do so, but that several elements still needed to be finalised (see Annex II). The Initiative’s organisational structure, although slightly changed since the last audit, remains complex because it relies on an extensive network of both EU bodies (the European External Action Service “EEAS”, DG DEVCO, the Joint Research Centre “JRC”), non-EU actors (the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute “UNICRI”, the Governance Team, regional secretariats, national teams), CBRN experts, civilian and military stakeholders and other international organisations (see Figure 1). The most notable change since our last audit has been the greater involvement of the JRC and on-site experts contracted by DG DEVCO.
This organisation, involving many CBRN actors, the bottom-up, national and regional approaches combine to make the Initiative a unique support mechanism. Partner country governments appoint a “national focal point” (NFP), who is their primary representative for the Initiative, responsible for liaising with CBRN stakeholders at the national (national team, project beneficiaries and other local actors) and international levels.
10The Centres of Excellence are built around eight regional secretariats (see Annex III). The regional secretariats are platforms to promote and facilitate cooperation at regional and international level. They liaise with and provide support to the national focal points in their region, organise regional round table meetings, facilitate information sharing, monitor to a certain extent, the regional activities and promote the Initiative.
Audit scope and approach
11One of the main objectives of this performance audit of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative was to follow-up the actions taken by the EEAS and the Commission to implement the recommendations in special report 17/2014 which were to:
- concentrate EU funding in the areas of most relevance to EU security;
- increase the capacities of the regional secretariats;
- increase the role of the EU delegations;
- involve partner countries in the initiation and implementation of projects;
- decrease the time gap between project proposals and project implementation;
- improve cooperation between decision-making and implementing bodies.
While our earlier audit concentrated on the set-up of the Initiative, this time we broadened the audit scope to include an assessment of the risk management approach, the Initiative’s implementation in partner countries, and the monitoring and evaluation systems. We aimed to answer the question: Has the Centres of Excellence Initiative contributed significantly to mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks from outside the EU?
13To answer this question, we addressed three sub-questions:
- Have the Commission and the EEAS adopted an adequate risk management approach?
- Has the Initiative been satisfactorily developed in partner countries?
- Have effective monitoring and evaluation systems been established to identify, assess and report on the Centres of Excellence Initiative’s results?
We carried out our audit between February and October 2017. We reviewed supporting documentation and interviewed representatives from the Commission (DGs DEVCO, JRC, ECHO, NEAR and HOME), the EEAS, UNICRI, the Governance Team and participants at the 5th International Meeting of National Focal Points in Brussels.
15We carried out audit visits to three partner countries: Georgia (June 2017), Jordan and Lebanon (September 2017). These countries are part of the Neighbourhood, the Initiative’s priority area, and the first two host regional secretariats14. We interviewed the heads of the regional secretariats, the regional coordinators, on-site technical assistance experts, the national focal points, the EU delegations, 15 project beneficiaries and 3 EU contractors (project implementers). We surveyed all regional secretariats (8) and a sample of other stakeholders (listed below) in order to obtain general information on the Initiative. We analysed all the written replies received from:
- the regional secretariats (5 out of 8 responded);
- national focal points (11 out of 18 responded);
- EU delegations (14 out of 18 responded);
- project implementers (6 out of 7 responded);
- EU CBRN contact points (5 out of the 10 responded).
Observations
Risk based prioritisation of activities still to be achieved
Urgent need to prioritise activities and spending
16To ensure the best use of limited resources, we recommended in special report 17/2014 to prioritise funding in the areas most relevant to EU security. According to DG HOME, the most direct CBRN risks to the EU’s security lie in the Middle East and Eastern Partnership countries15, followed by the North African countries, which together represent 20 % of the partner countries. Despite this, DG DEVCO’s geographical priorities (South East and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa Sahel, the African Atlantic Façade, and Eastern and Central Africa) cover 70 % of the partner countries, many of which are not regarded as having the most direct CBRN risks to the EU.
17DG DEVCO and the EEAS have in fact encouraged more partner countries to join the Initiative. As a result, the number of partner countries has continued to grow instead of concentrating efforts on a more limited number of countries16. In October 2017, the number of partner countries had increased by 15 from 43 to 58 since our last audit (see Annex IV) and interest in the Initiative continues to grow17. As resources are limited, the geographical expansion implies less final assistance on average per country.
18At the time of special report 17/2014, we looked at the systems for selecting and implementing the first 40 projects. We compared the project funding allocation from projects 1 to 40 (first period) to projects 41 to 60 (second period). Figure 2 shows that South East and Eastern Europe, which is a priority for the EU, has been the largest overall recipient of project funding (21 %) but received less in the latest period. From project 41 onwards, the African Atlantic Façade, which, aside from Morocco, is not part of the Neighbourhood, has been the largest beneficiary. The South East Asia region is the third highest financial recipient but is not one of the high priority risks areas. Although risks are higher in the Middle East and North Africa Sahel (see paragraph 16)18, these regions (except for the Gulf Cooperation Council region) have received the lowest share of funding in the second period. Overall, they received respectively 13 % and 9 % of the project funding. The regions representing the most direct CBRN risks to the EU (see paragraph 16) received in total 43 % of the total project allocation. Projects are therefore not prioritised on the basis of risks linked to the geographical location. This is contrary to our previous recommendation, which the Commission had accepted.
19Following a demand-driven or bottom-up approach19, the regions submit project proposals to DG DEVCO. Yet, the Commission selects the projects to finance but it does not apply risk-based selection criteria even though its own working document commented that EU security would benefit from a more extensive use of assessments of threats and risks20. Instead, project proposals are admitted on a first-come-first-served basis, which the Commission hopes will stimulate competition among the regions. In practice, the Initiative’s funds are spread over a greater number of partner countries.
Furthermore, no thematic fields are given priority. Whereas prevention measures were the main focus of the initial EU CBRN domestic policy21, the IcSP legal framework22 does not specify which external mitigation measures should be prioritised (preparedness, prevention, detection or response). However, DG HOME and DG DEVCO experts recommend that, as a first step, the CBRN material should be identified and secured. We identified only three projects which were concentrated on the identification of CBRN facilities and the material therein. In addition, only five projects out of 66, representing 9 % of expenditure, tackled chemical risks exclusively (see Annex V), although the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) considers this as the threat most likely to materialise.
21In 2017, the Commission has started to use the Initiative to address more security-related matters such as counter-terrorism, the fight against cybercrime, the protection of critical infrastructures, combatting trafficking of falsified medicines, maritime security, and explosives. Because the Initiative’s resources are limited, the Commission intends to fund these new activities from other budget lines while making use of the Centres of Excellence structures. However, there are still a large number of measures necessary to address traditional CBRN risks23. National focal points have mobilised their efforts in the CBRN area and expect to see results. Expanding the Initiative to other thematic fields requires additional work, while much remains to be done in the CBRN domain.
The identification of partner countries’ needs and priorities still takes too long and is not based on systemic risk assessments
22The JRC has devised a needs assessment questionnaire (NAQ) for partner countries. The questions were generic and related to subjects such as the existence or not in the partner country of a national legal framework, an institutional framework governing the safety and security of CBRN materials and facilities. The concept of risks was not embedded in the JRC’s methodology and there was not sufficient guidance as to how risks should be identified and prioritised. The gaps identified through the questionnaire are the basis for the development of a CBRN National Action Plan (NAP) to mitigate these risks.
23JRC experts assisted the partner countries’ CBRN national teams24 in replying to the questions but the NAQ remains a self-assessment exercise carried out by the partner countries. To carry out the NAQ and NAP exercises, the Commission recommends that the national teams include representatives from a wide range of ministries (see Figure 1) and other recognised contact points25. Our analysis shows that the national teams did not systematically include experts drawn from the full range of CBRN fields.
24By October 2017, 26 partner countries of 58 (45 %) had finalised their NAQ and only 18 partner countries (31 %) had devised a NAP. Four partner countries did so without applying the NAQ methodology (see Annex I).
25One reason for the fact that not all partner countries have been through the NAQ/NAP processes is that it is a voluntary exercise requiring political will. Another reason why a limited number of partner countries had finalised their NAQs and NAPs is the political instability in certain partner countries, complicating the planning. Finally, the JRC could not respond quickly enough to all demands for NAQ/NAP assistance.
26The growing demand from partner countries to perform the NAQ/NAP exercises and the ongoing expansion of the Initiative have put a definite strain on the JRC’s human resources. The resources allocated to the Initiative have been reduced from 200 person months in 2015 to 105 in 2017. The JRC’s inability to cope with its workload has resulted in significant delays in holding workshops. As at 31 October 2017, 19 months was the average time spent waiting for a NAQ or NAP workshop after filing a request or attending a previous workshop. There is a risk that momentum will be lost if the NAQ and NAP exercises are not carried out on time, thereby impairing the Initiative’s credibility.
Certain aspects of the Initiative have been satisfactorily developed in partner countries
The Initiative has helped to strengthen CBRN governance in partner countries and increase regional cooperation…
27The Initiative’s two major successes are the establishment of CBRN national teams and the initiation of regional cooperation. National structures took a long time to set up, thus, delaying the implementation of activities. By October 2017, though, the vast majority of countries (see Annex I) had appointed a national focal point and created a national team to ensure interagency cooperation and improve national CBRN governance. Governance is further reinforced through the NAQ and NAP exercises (see paragraphs 22 and 24).
28The regional secretariats26 assist the partner countries in assessing and addressing their needs and facilitate their coordination. They contribute to the creation of a CBRN network. In special report 17/2014 we noted, however, that they lacked technical expertise. DG DEVCO fully implemented our recommendation through the deployment of six on-site technical assistance experts (known as “OSAs” and referred to hereafter as “on-site experts”) to seven regional secretariats27. These on-site experts contribute to building CBRN governance in partner countries through technical support to the national teams, national focal points and regional secretariats. They organise training sessions, exercises, facilitate national team meetings and prepare and attend the NAQ and NAP workshops. They also contribute to improve regional cooperation in formulating needs and projects, drafting terms of references and monitoring the implementation of regional projects. The partner countries have a positive view of these on-site-experts.
29Regional secretariats have also improved cooperation and coordination with other international organisations28 (see Box 1). For example, the regional secretariats assisted six partner countries in receiving support from the Implementation Support Unit for the Biological Weapons Convention.
Box 1
Increasing cooperation with other international organisations
Following the Ebola crisis, in October 2017 the Italian Presidency of the G7 Global Partnership and the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence organised a workshop with 11 African countries to identify measures for mitigating biosafety and biosecurity risks in Africa.
For the first time, the needs assessments and action plans developed in line with several international initiatives and obligations29 were compared, enabling coordination and consolidation of existing information in relation to the various initiatives. DG DEVCO’s plan is to continue this exercise to further fine-tune measures tackling the top biosafety and biosecurity priorities for future action.
We reported in special report 17/2014 that the partner countries were not sufficiently involved in project selection, although the Initiative was supposed to be bottom-up in nature.
31Since project 33 (March 2013), projects are discussed at regional round table meetings and there are twice as many bottom-up projects30 (20) as top-down ones (9) proposed by DG DEVCO (see Annex VI). At least half of projects31 involve local experts in their implementation. Our recommendation, contained in our earlier special report 17/2014, has been fully implemented. The Initiative’s projects now foster a greater sense of local ownership and a culture of consensus.
32The time gap between project proposals and project implementation, which we recommended should be shortened, is still long (see Annex VI) – upwards of 18 months on average. The Commission has recently changed the approach for identifying the specific beneficiary needs but it is too early to determine the extent to which this new method will speed up the start of the project’s activities. Therefore, we conclude that the recommendation has been partially implemented.
33Regional action plans do not yet exist. The national action plans that have been finalised have spurred discussions on potential regional activities/projects. Moreover, the regional secretariats, sometimes with the support of the on-site-experts, gather and consolidate information on national needs in order to establish regional priorities. A home-grown regional approach has started to emerge in three regions as a result of increased trust and a greater sense of ownership (see Box 2).
Box 2
Identifying regional needs
In April 2016, national experts from all the South East Asia partner countries met for the first time to discuss the regional priorities (based on an analysis of the NAQ, NAPs, previous/ongoing projects and lists of priorities). The meeting produced seven regional project proposals. While this is a positive indicator of increasing initiative, the proposals required significant revision, prompting the decision to deploy an on-site expert to the region from 2018 onwards.
The South East and Eastern Europe Secretariat analysed the existing NAPs in the region, past project proposals including those refused. They also invited the national focal points to list their priorities. Based on this information, the region adopted in 2016 a regional strategy listing 10 priorities. The region is finalising the terms of reference for a project proposal on chemical and biological waste management.
In the African Atlantic Façade, the national focal points assessed that the activities proposed by project implementers did not match local needs, because the terms of reference were not specific enough. Local experts were hired to collect information, analyse and define the actual needs, and develop project proposals. The terms of reference for two recent project proposals32 were drafted on this basis. This practice could reduce the length of the inception phase.
Projects have delivered some or all of their planned outputs. Many projects included training, ranging from a general introduction and awareness-raising to more operational capacity-building exercises. Projects sometimes involved study visits to EU Member States, supplied CBRN equipment, produced educational material – such as handbooks, best practice guidelines, methodology manuals and national response plans – and have fed into the adoption or revision of legislation and regulations (see Box 3).
Box 3
Success story awards
The national focal points and heads of regional secretariats are encouraged to champion the Initiative’s success stories. The Centres of Excellence awards presented at the 5th Annual NFP Meeting celebrated some such achievements.
Zambia received the prize for the biggest national success story for having revised its national legal framework for CBRN risk management. This resulted in the Counter Terrorism Amendment Act No 2 of 2015, leading to the creation of a national counter terrorism centre which has among its responsibilities the capacities to detect, control and respond to CBRN risks.
The tabletop and field simulation exercises33 run under the auspices of the Initiative are highly valued by the partner countries34 (see Box 4). Those surveyed said that they would like more field exercises to be funded (with relevant prior training), seeing these as the best form of hands-on learning.
Box 4
FALCON I tabletop exercise
The Gulf Cooperation Council Countries was the last region to join the Initiative. Although no regional project has yet been developed, the regional secretariat created a dynamic in the region with the organisation in February 2016 of a workshop and tabletop exercise, focusing on nuclear detection and response, funded mainly by the United Arab Emirates and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The first of its kind, the “FALCON” exercise was designed to enhance regional cooperation and information-sharing, and improve the national scenarios adopted by each country35. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Customs Organization attended the event as observers.
A second exercise is planned for 2018-2019. FALCON II will focus first on building radiological detection and response capacities, and then on tabletop and field exercises.
… but important obstacles still hinder the achievement of the Initiative’s full potential …
36Despite the achievements noted in the previous section, important obstacles remain. These hinder the Initiative in achieving its full potential to create an interconnected CBRN community at the national, regional and international level.
… in the partner country
37A number of factors adversely affected the degree to which CBRN governance was strengthened and risks were mitigated in the partner countries. These included limitations on the mandate and legal status of the national team as a whole, and the NFP in particular. Other obstacles included the lack of availability of national team members, political instability and funding shortfalls. The on-site experts facilitated national team meetings in a number of countries, but this support is not sustainable in the long-term.
38The national focal points are key players of the network as they coordinate the work done by the CBRN stakeholders in their respective countries and are the national contact points for the Initiative. The Commission intends that they become the single entry point for all CBRN-related matters. However, they are often not given sufficient prominence and authority by the various institutions that constitute the national team and by their own governments.
39Since special report 17/2014, DG DEVCO has deployed IcSP long-term regional cooperation officers to only four EU delegations36 (Nairobi, Manila, Dakar and Islamabad). The first two of these countries host regional secretariats, whereas the latter two do not. The IcSP long-term regional cooperation officers liaise with the other EU delegations in the regions to which they have been deployed. However, their responsibilities are not limited to CBRN matters alone but include other security activities37.
40The EU delegation’s involvement in promoting the Initiative and mobilising political will within the country and the regions has increased but is still insufficient. CBRN matters were not systematically included in the policy, security or political dialogue. The extent of their information was often dependent on the presence of IcSP long-term regional cooperation officers in the region. There had been no CBRN involvement from the EU delegation in some countries in priority regions. Overall, we consider that the EEAS and the Commission have partially implemented our previous recommendation.
… or in the region and beyond
41Our across-the-board analysis showed that most projects did not set regional cooperation as a primary objective, since all partner countries wish to address their national needs first. While there is a clear need to strike a balance between developing national CBRN risk mitigation capacities and reinforcing regional cooperation, the ratio of national to regional activities among the projects for which we had sufficient information, was 70:30.
42Reinforcing CBRN networks at national and regional level is a key requirement to ensure an adequate response in case of an incident involving CBRN agents. The Initiative aims to help partner countries in cooperating and collaborating. However, regional interaction was not frequent. Regional round table meetings (see Figure 1 and Annex I), where projects are discussed, are generally held twice per year but national experts are invited only once, thereby limiting the expertise present. DG DEVCO also organises a yearly meeting with the heads of the regional secretariats alone. The national focal points and on-site experts have said that there is a need to hold more regular regional meetings, invite international experts, organise brief workshops/training sessions and run more tabletop and field exercises.
43Currently there is no discussion forum or space to share guidelines, best practices, studies or lessons learned from international organisations or from EU projects funded under other programmes (for instance the Prevention of and Fight against Crime, the 7th Research Framework Programme, the Internal Security Fund-Police and Horizon 2020) in the CBRN area with partner countries.
… in exploring other funding possibilities
44The future of the Initiative depends to a large extent on the implementation of the national action plans. These NAPs list many measures (see examples in Annex V) which cannot be carried out in full using national budgets and Initiative resources alone, whereas other sources of funding exist and can be used such as for instance, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the European Development Fund or the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.
45The NAP is a key document for facilitating donor coordination in the CBRN field and thus for directing further resources towards national capacity-building (see Box 5).
Box 5
Development of the Georgian national action plan
In 2015, Georgia adopted its 2015-2019 CBRN national action plan. Although it was not developed using the Initiative’s needs assessment methodology, Georgia’s NAP was one of the first adopted among the partner countries.
It includes 30 priorities and 118 specific measures. The Interagency Coordination Council of Georgia meets annually to discuss implementation of the NAP. Donors are also invited to this event.
A key outcome of the special Donor Coordination meeting in November 2017 was a needs assessment document, compiled by the Georgian side, which should help donors, including the EU, in planning their assistance in the field of CBRN. Two EU Member States offered assistance on emergency medical response/civil protection and the training of CBRN military units. Additionally, a major non-EU donor announced that all future CBRN-related assistance to Georgia would be aligned with the NAP.
The EU delegations can play a significant role in identifying other sources of funding. They can include CBRN topics such as food safety, bio-safety, bio-security, chemical pollution, safety standards, CBRN legal frameworks in projects funded in traditional development sectors (e.g. agriculture, environment, health, justice). However, most of EU delegations surveyed have not sought additional funds for the CBRN activities.
47The vast majority of the surveyed EU delegations indicated that donor coordination meetings with EU Member States had not yet taken place.
48Despite the fact that the Neighbourhood is a priority area for the Initiative and the EU generally, DG NEAR’s involvement has been limited to date. Greater interaction of DG DEVCO with other Commission Directorates-General, for instance DG NEAR and DG ECHO, would also make it easier to fill the identified gaps that the Initiative has not been able to address.
Inadequate monitoring and evaluation
49The Initiative should disclose the results achieved, in order to steer future strategic and operational choices, and to generate the level of interest and political engagement needed for its success.
50While having overall responsibility for monitoring the Initiative, DG DEVCO relies on other stakeholders for the necessary feedback. They collect information, monitor and evaluate the Initiative’s activities through:
- a CBRN Centres of Excellence web-based portal (“the portal”);
- steering committee meetings with project implementers;
- coordination committees with the EEAS, the JRC, UNICRI, the Governance Team and on-site experts;
- reports from UNICRI, the Governance Team, on-site experts and project implementers;
- results-oriented on-the-spot monitoring missions;
- JRC evaluation reports.
The portal: a potential information and monitoring tool
51The portal is a restricted-access web-platform which should, according to DG DEVCO, include all project documentation. It is also intended to inform stakeholders of planned activities, publish minutes of key meetings and contact lists. However, the information published is sporadic, incomplete, poorly structured and not easily accessible in a user-friendly (or mobile-friendly) format. The JRC is responsible for maintaining the portal, but it relies on DG DEVCO to provide project documentation. Currently, the portal is not fulfilling its potential as an operational and management tool (see Annex VII), or as a forum for discussion (see paragraph 43).
52Project implementers rely on the portal to learn from previous projects. As the portal is incomplete and does not include an inventory of project outputs, project implementers do not systematically have access to this information. This has resulted in a certain duplication of activities. For instance some introductory CBRN training programmes have been repeated in several projects without re-using similar produced material, which could have reduced project costs.
Other monitoring tools
53DG DEVCO, the JRC, the regional secretariats and national focal points did not systematically collect and consolidate information anywhere outside the portal either. The high number of actors involved, poor record-keeping and incomplete project information complicate and impair the Commission’s oversight, monitoring and evaluation of projects.
54DG DEVCO followed up project activities at steering committee meetings. However, poor record-keeping by DG DEVCO prevented us from confirming that regular meetings had taken place and that the contractual obligations had been respected.
55We recommended in special report 17/2014 that cooperation be improved between decision-making and implementing bodies by, for instance, re-establishing the coordination committee. These meetings resumed in 2014 and usually took place twice a year. They facilitated the management of the Initiative by providing a global overview of the activities carried out by the different key actors38. The recommendation, in our previous special report 17/2014, is considered to be fully implemented.
56DG DEVCO also monitors results on the basis of on-the-spot visits carried out by external experts. At the time of our audit, only six results-oriented monitoring reports had been finalised for 60 projects implemented through the Initiative, one of these reports being the on-site technical assistance. Results-oriented monitoring visits were not carried out on projects implemented by the JRC, although these cannot be evaluated by the JRC itself.
The evaluation of results is not satisfactory
57The lack of clear, well-defined objectives, together with the absence of relevant outcome/impact indicators at both the Initiative and project level39, made it impossible to assess the results in terms of improved capacities to mitigate and prepare for CBRN risks and threats. In addition, the Initiative’s achievements could not be measured because the projects’ outcomes and impact were not linked to the overarching objectives.
58The JRC is responsible for all project evaluations but has outsourced most project evaluations to external experts, since September 2016. All evaluations have been desk-based and rely on the input from the JRC. We found that one third of the evaluations had not been completed due to insufficient availability of project documentation (see paragraph 51).
59Despite being desk-based, the final evaluations took on average 19 months after publication of the final reports (and even longer after project completion). The mid-term evaluations were not finalised until the projects were almost complete. Recommendations, where they were made, were often effectively redundant as it was too late to apply them40.
60The fact that most projects are stand-alone activities, unaccompanied by a longer-term plan, is not conducive to their sustainability. The vast majority of projects we examined lacked provisions for ensuring the sustainability of their outcomes. Even if some projects have provided first responders with CBRN equipment, many partner countries lack basic equipment, often making the activities implemented too advanced for their technical capacities. As CBRN is not the highest priority, national funding is limited, putting the continuation of the achieved outcomes in jeopardy. Only a handful of training activities – including training-of-trainer exercises – have continued beyond the end of the project.
Conclusions and recommendations
61The Initiative is the EU’s largest civilian external security programme. The concept embraces a unique regional and interagency approach, involving many actors (see paragraphs 8 to 10). Overall, the Initiative is one of the main tools to mitigate CBRN threats and risks from outside the EU (paragraph 4). We conclude that the Initiative has contributed to mitigating these CBRN threats, but that many challenges remain (see paragraphs 16 to 60).
62The Commission and the EEAS have fully implemented three out of six of the recommendations, contained in our special report 17/2014, and partially implemented two of them (Annex II and paragraphs 11, 16 to 21, 28, 30 to 32, 39 to 40 and 55). Partner countries are now more involved in the initiation and implementation of projects, the organization at regional level has been strengthened and cooperation between decision-makers and implementing bodies has improved. While some progress has been made, the role of the EU delegations and the speed of project implementation are still not satisfactory (paragraphs 27 to 48). One of our earlier recommendation, which proposed to concentrate EU funding in the areas most relevant to EU security and was accepted by the Commission, has not been implemented (see paragraphs 16 to 21).
63The Initiative’s success hinges on the ability to adapt and address the key challenges which it now faces. The recommendations that follow, which are designed to address the shortcomings arising from the audit, aim to further strengthen and sustain the Initiative.
64An adequate risk management approach to the activities of the Initiative has not yet been developed for the Initiative as a whole, at the project selection stage and for the identification of partner countries’ needs (paragraphs 18 to 23).
65The Commission provides partner countries with tools and a methodology to help them assess their own needs and develop national action plans to mitigate CBRN risks (see paragraphs 22 and 23). However, not sufficient guidance is given as how risks should be identified and prioritised (see paragraph 23). Despite this drawback, the needs assessment questionnaire and national action plan are still key elements that underpin the Initiative. However, the Commission cannot respond quickly enough to meet all partner countries’ requests for assistance in identifying and prioritising their needs; and this risks to seriously delay the preparation of both the questionnaires and the action plans (see paragraph 26).
Recommendation 1 – Prioritise activities on the basis of a systemic risk assessment
The Commission and the EEAS should:
- carry out a joint EU analysis identifying external CBRN risks to the EU to comprehensively link internal and external action.
The Commission should:
- embed systemic risk assessments into the needs assessment and national action plan methodologies;
- respond quickly to all partner countries requesting assistance to finalise their needs assessment and national action plan exercises.
Target implementation date: June 2019.
66A number of aspects of the Initiative have been developed in partner countries in addition to the improvements resulting from our previous recommendations. The Initiative has promoted a culture of safety and cooperation (see paragraphs 22 and 31). CBRN national teams have been appointed in the majority of the partner countries. Projects have delivered most of their outputs; stakeholders have especially valued operational capacity-building exercises (see paragraphs 34 to 35).
67Regional cooperation has been initiated but it is still lacking as partner countries do not have sufficient interaction and wish to address their national needs first (see paragraphs 33, 41 to 43).
Recommendation 2 – Strengthen the Initiative’s regional dimension
The Commission should increase the number of regional activities, such as field and tabletop exercises.
Target implementation date: December 2019.
68Since our earlier special report 17/2014, the EU delegations’ involvement in the Initiative has improved. However, they were insufficiently active in promoting the Initiative and mobilising political will (see paragraphs 39 and 40). CBRN was not systematically included in the policy, security or political dialogue.
Recommendation 3 – Further strengthen the EU delegations’ role in the Initiative
The Commission and the EEAS should jointly:
- assign CBRN responsibilities to designated focal points and/or IcSP long-term regional cooperation officers in all the EU delegations;
- include CBRN in the policy, security and political dialogue.
Target implementation date: December 2018.
69Interaction between the Commission’s Directorates-General and with the donor community, particularly on the question of the potential funding available, was limited (see paragraphs 44 to 48).
Recommendation 4 – Identify potential synergies and other available funding sources
DG DEVCO and the EEAS should work together with other relevant Commission Directorates-General, in particular with DG NEAR, as well as with other donors in order to identify potential synergies and available funding sources which could be better used to support CBRN activities.
Target implementation date: June 2019.
70The Commission’s monitoring and evaluation was inadequate owing to incomplete and sporadic information, poor record-keeping and insufficient partner country involvement (see paragraphs 51 to 60). The lack of clear objectives, relevant indicators and data collected on the ground impaired the assessment of the outcome and impact of projects and the Initiative as a whole.
Recommendation 5 – Increase accountability and visibility of activities and results through improved monitoring and evaluation
The Commission should:
- translate the Initiative’s overall objective into more specific objectives that can be used at project level, enabling results to be measured from the project level up to the national, regional and Initiative-wide level;
- define outcome and impact indicators allowing the Initiative’s effectiveness to be assessed against the set objectives.
Target implementation date: December 2019.
71The CBRN web-based portal has considerable potential as an operational database for the implementation and management of the Initiative’s activities but it is not yet an effective, complete, up to date and structured repository of activities, lessons learned and best practices (see paragraphs 51 to 59).
Recommendation 6 – Overhaul the web-based portal to allow easy access to all the information concerning the Initiative’s activities
The Commission should ensure that:
- all relevant information is available on its web-based portal with the appropriate levels of access authorisation;
- best practices and guidelines are accessible through the CBRN portal.
Target implementation date: December 2018.
This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 24 April 2018.
For the Court of Auditors
President
Klaus-Heiner LEHNE
Annexes
Annex I
The Initiative in numbers
Period | 2009-2013 | 2014-2017 | 2020 |
Budget | €109 million Yearly average= ± 22 |
€76 million Yearly average = ± 19 |
|
€130 million | |||
Allocated | €97 million for projects | ||
€41 million for assistance (capacity building and governance) |
Source: European Court of Auditors based on CRIS.
8 regions and 58 partner countries in October 2017
Number of | AAF | NAS | SEEE | MIE | GCC | ECA | CA | SEA | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Partner countries | 10 | 6 (+1) | 10 | 3 | 3 | 11 | 5 | 10 | 58 |
NFPs | 10 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 11 | 5 | 9 | 57 |
National teams | 10 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 46 |
Round table meetings | 12 | 7 | 14 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 13 | NA |
Finalised needs assessment questionnaires | 6 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 26 |
Finalised national action plans | 4 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 18 |
Source: European Court of Auditors based on JRC documents, on-site technical assistance reports, round table meetings minutes and CRIS.
Annex II
Follow-up of the recommendations included in special report 17/2014
Recommendations | Current status | References in the text |
---|---|---|
Concentrate EU funding in the areas of most relevance to EU security so to get the most direct benefit. | Not implemented | Paragraphs 16 to 21 |
Increase the capacities of the regional secretariats by adding technical expertise. | Fully implemented | Paragraph 28 |
Increase the role of the EU delegations, particularly in the countries where a regional secretariat has been set up. | Partially implemented | Paragraphs 39 to 40 |
Take measures not only to involve partner countries in the initiation of projects but also in their implementation. This would increase their ownership of the measures and ensure their sustainability. | Fully implemented | Paragraphs 30 to 31 |
Continue efforts to improve procedures in order to decrease the time gap between project proposals and project implementation. | Partially implemented | Paragraph 32 |
Improve cooperation between decision-making and implementing bodies, for instance by reviving the coordination committee. | Fully implemented | Paragraph 55 |
Source: European Court of Auditors.
Annex III
Regional secretariats and partner countries in October 2017
Abbreviation | Region | Countries involved |
---|---|---|
SEA | South East Asia | Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam |
AAF | African Atlantic Façade | Benin, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo |
NAS | North Africa Sahel | Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia |
SEEE | South East and Eastern Europe | Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine |
CA | Central Asia | Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan |
MIE | Middle East | Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon |
ECA | Eastern and Central Africa | Burundi, Democratic republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia |
GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council Countries | United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia |
Source: European Court of Auditors based on DG DEVCO and the EEAS.
Annex IV
Geographical distribution of the Initiative
Annex V
Examples of CBRN priorities extracted from the National Action Plans from four partner countries
Source: UNICRI’s posters based on the information shared by the Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Lao’s people democratic Republic and Georgia.
Annex VI
List of projects
No | Project title | Budget (€) | Region | Bottom-up | Formulation of idea | Start date | End date | CBRN areas covered |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
66 | MEDISAFE – Combating illicit traffic and enhancing the safety of medicines in Eastern and Central Africa | In preparation | ECA | hybrid | CB | |||
65 | Strengthening chemical and biological waste management in Central Asia countries for improved security and safety risk mitigation | 3 000 000 | CA | Y | 2.06.16 | CB | ||
64 | EU P2P - Export Control Programme for dual use goods 2017 | 3 000 000 | NAS, SEEE | N | RN | |||
63 | Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for the training of personnel in charge of cross-border control | 1 000 000 | NAS | Y | Related to P 55 | CBRN | ||
62 | On-site Technical Support to CBRN Centre of Excellence (CoE) | In preparation | SEA | NA | CBRN | |||
61 | Sound management of chemicals and their associated wastes in Southeast Asia (SEACHEM) | 2 999 815 | SEA | Y | 3.4.14 | 1.9.17 | 1.9.20 | C |
60 | Support to the Centre of Excellence of Eastern and Central Africa in Nuclear Security | 3 500 000 | ECA | Y | 8.11.16 | 7.11.19 | RN | |
59 | Strengthening the CBRN Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Gulf Cooperation Council Region | 285 000 | GCC | NA | 15.9.15 | 14.9.16 | CBRN | |
58 | Provision of specialized equipment for CBRN forensics in the SEEE CoE Region | 1 871 115 | SEEE | Y | 8.4.14 related to P 57 | 15.1.17 | 30.4.18 | CBRN |
57 | Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities in investigating CBRN incidents in the South East and Eastern Europe Centres of Excellence region | 1 399 670 | SEEE | Y | 8.4.14 | 14.1.20 | CBRN | |
56 | On-site technical assistance 2 On-site technical assistance to the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Centres of Excellence Secretariats in Algiers and Tashkent | 2 130 250 | CA, NAS | NA | 10.11.19 | CBRN | ||
55 | Strengthening cross-border capacity for control and detection of CBRN substances | 3 500 000 | NAS, AAF | Y | 2.7.13 | 30.9.19 | CBRN | |
54 | Capacity building for medical preparedness and response to CBRN incidents | 2 999 965 | MIE | Y | 26.2.14 | 17.7.19 | CBRN | |
53 | Strengthening the national legal frameworks and provision of specialized training on bio-safety and bio-security in Central Asian countries | 5 000 000 | CA | Y | 25.3.15 | 22.12.15 | 21.12.18 | B |
52 | Provision of specialized CBRN equipment for first responders in in the SEE CoE Region | 1 697 563 | SEEE | Y | 10.7.13 related to P 44 | 11.12.15 | 10.6.18 | CBRN |
51 | On-site technical assistance to the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Centres of Excellence secretariats in Georgia, Kenya and Morocco | 2 969 700 | SEEE, CA, AAF | NA | 15.9.15 | 14.9.18 | CBRN | |
50 | Provision of specialised equipment to enhance CBRN preparedness and response capabilities | 2 634 042 | AAF, ECA | Y | 1.4.14 | 1.10.15 | 30.6.19 | CBRN |
49 | One Health Project in Pakistan | 927 608 | CA | N | 5.1.15 | 4.1.18 | B | |
48 | Improved regional management of outbreaks in the CBRN centres of excellence partner countries of the African Atlantic Façade region. | 3 499 600 | AAF | Y | 1.6.14 | 1.1.16 | 31.12.18 | B |
47 | EU outreach programme for dual use items - South-East Asia | 3 472 100 | SEA | Y | 3.4.14 | 1.9.15 | 31.8.18 | CBRN |
46 | Enhancement of CBRN capacities of South East Asia in addressing CBRN risk mitigation concerning CBRN first response, biosafety and biosecurity, awareness raising and legal framework | 3 000 000 | SEA | Y | 3.4.14 | 107.15 | 9.7.18 | CBRN |
45 | Establishment of a Mobile Laboratory for in situ interventions on VHF outbreak sites in combination with CBRN Capacity Building in Western Africa (EUWAM-Lab) | 2 579 854 | AAF | N | 18.9.14 | 17.11.17 | B | |
44 | Strengthening CBRN first response capabilities and regional cooperation in South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine | 2 953 550 | SEEE | Y | 10.7.13 | 1.1.15 | 30.4.18 | CBRN |
43 | EU outreach programme for dual use items | 2 249 250 | SEEE, MIE, GCC,NAS CA | N | 1.9.15 | 30.6.17 | CBRN | |
42 | Chemical safety and security in the Central and Eastern African region | 2 978 000 | ECA, AAF | Y | 6.5.14 | 5.1.15 | 4.1.18 | C |
41 | High risk chemical facilities and risk mitigation in the AAF region | 3 000 000 | AAF, NAS | Y | 1.6.14 | 1.1.15 | 31.12.17 | C |
40 | Strengthening Health Laboratories to minimize potential biological risks | 4 495 712 | SEEE, NAS, MIE, CA | N | 18.12.13 | 17.12.17 | B | |
39 | Strengthening Health Security at Ports, Airports and Ground crossings | 1 432 757 | CA,GCC, MIE,NAS | N | 24.7.13 | 23.11.15 | B | |
38 | Export control outreach for dual use items | 3 500 000 | CA, MIE | N | 30.12.13 | 29.7.19 | CBRN | |
37 | Preventing Vector Borne Diseases around the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions by creating new networks MEDILABSECURE | 3 626 410 | SEEE, MIE,NAS | N | 6.1.14 | 5.7.18 | B | |
36 | Further development and consolidation of the Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (“MediPIET”) | 6 400 000 | SEEE, MIE,NAS | N | 1.1.14 | 31.12.17 | B | |
35 | AAF- Waste management | 3 871 800 | AAF | Y | 20.3.13 | 1.1.14 | 31.12.17 | CB |
34 | Strengthening Capacities in CBRN Response and in Chemical and Medical Emergency | 3 914 034 | MIE | Y | 1.9.12 | 23.12.13 | 22.6.17 | CBRN |
33 | Strengthening the National CBRN Legal Framework& Provision of specialized and technical training to enhance CBRN preparedness and response capabilities | 2 699 069 | AAF, ECA | Y | 20.3.13 | 15.9.13 | 28.2.17 | CBRN |
32 | Establishment of a Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MediPIET) | 400 000 | MIE, NAS, SEEE,AAF | N | 1.1.13 | 31.12.14 | B | |
31 | Network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on dual-use concerns of chemical materials | 614 883 | CA,MIE, AAF, NAS, SEEE,SEA | Y | 21.12.12 | 20.4.15 | C | |
30 | Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in South East Asia Region | 600 000 | SEEE, SEA | Y | 21.12.12 | 20.12.16 | RN | |
29 | Regional Human Resource Development for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management through a University Master’s Programme carried out in Thailand | 624 451 | SEA | Y | 21.12.12 | 20.3.16 | RN | |
28 | Supporting development of an integrated national security system for nuclear and radioactive materials | 1 000 000 | SEA | Y | 21.12.12 | 20.12.16 | RN | |
27 | Bio-risk management | 480 000 | SEA | Y | 21.12.12 | 30.6.15 | B | |
26 | Prerequisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks | 299 936 | MIE, NAS | Y | 17.12.12 | 16.12.14 | CBRN | |
25 | Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on bio-safety/bio-security/bio-risk management | 434 010 | MIE | N | 12.12.12 | 11.4.15 | B | |
24 | Development of a methodology for RN materials detection, management and protection of the public | 599 830 | AAF | Y | 18.12.12 | 17.12.17 | RN | |
23 | Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances | 492405 | AAF, SEEE, MIE, NAS, SEA | N | 10.12.12 | 9.12.14 | CBRN | |
22 | Provision of specialised technical training to enhance the first responders’ capabilities in case of CBRN incidents | 677 766 | AAF, SEA | Y | 17.12.12 | 16.12.14 | CBRN | |
21 | Building regional border control capacity to identify and detect CRN materials | 700 000 | AAF,SEA | Y | 21.12.12 | 20.12.16 | CRN | |
20 | not contracted | |||||||
19 | Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management system and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control | 400 000 | AAF, CA, ECA,MIE, NAS, SEEE, SEA | N | 01.03.13 | 30.6.15 | CBRN | |
18 | International Network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on dual-use concerns in bio-technology | 399 719 | AAF, CA,MIE,NAS, SEEE, SEA | N | 01.03.13 | 31.12.14 | B | |
17 | Establishing a National Response Plan in Ghana and Kenya for responding to unauthorised events involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials | 240 000 | ECA,AAF | Y | 15.05.13 | 15.5.15 | CBRN | |
16 | Supporting development of an integrated national nuclear security system | 400 000 | NAS, AAF | Y | 01.01.13 | 30.9.15 | RN | |
15 | Strengthening laboratory bio-safety and bio-security through development of a laboratory iso-bank system | 480 000 | SEA | N | 01.08.13 | 30.6.15 | CBRN | |
14 | Provision of specialised and technical training to enhance the First Response Capabilities (CBRN FRstCap) | 400 000 | SEEE | N | 01.04.13 | 31.3.15 | CBRN | |
13 | Capacity building and raising awareness for identifying and responding to threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials in Sub Saharan African countries | 319 924 | ECA | N | 01.01.13 | 30.6.15 | CBRN | |
12 | Sharing experience between EU and South East Asian countries on the reinforcement of legislations and regulations in the field of bio-safety and bio-security, as well as relevant laboratories management systems through Regional Centre of Excellence - phase 2 | 320 000 | SEA | N | 01.04.13 | 31.3.15 | B | |
11 | Promoting good practice and interagency procedures for assessing the risks of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear misuse | 1 915 452 | AAF,MIE, NAS, SEEE,SEA | N | 01.01.13 | 31.12.14 | CBRN | |
10 | Development of e-learning courses for CBRN risk mitigation | 399 806 | AAF,CA,ECA,MIE,NAS, SEEE,SEA | Y | 01.01.13 | 31.3.15 | CBRN | |
9 | National Response Plan in Lebanon for CBRN Events | 159 900 | MIE | N | 01.01.13 | 31.12.14 | CBRN | |
8 | Prerequisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks | 800 000 | SEA | Y | 01.01.13 | 30.6.15 | CBRN | |
7 | Guidelines, procedures and standardisation on bio-safety/bio-security | 1 199 576 | SEEE, SEA | Y | 01.01.13 | 31.3.15 | B | |
6 | Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on chemical and biological waste management | 480 000 | SEA | Y | 01.01.13 | 31.12.14 | CB | |
5 | Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on CBRN import/export monitoring | 1 440 000 | AAF,CA,MIE,NAS | N | 01.01.13 | 31.12.14 | CBRN | |
4 | Interagency CBRN Response Programme (ICP) | 959 675 | SEEE,SEA | Y | 01.01.13 | 31.12.14 | CBRN | |
3 | Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on bio-safety/bio-security/bio-risk management | 1 920 000 | AAF,NAS,SEEE,SEA | Y | 01.01.13 | 30.6.15 | B | |
2 | Building Capacity to identify and respond to threats from Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear substances (CBRNcap) | 160 000 | SEEE | N | 01.01.13 | 31.3.15 | CBRN | |
1 | Identification and strengthening forensic capacities in the area of prevention of organised crime and illicit trafficking of chemical agents, including training and equipment for the line officers | 640 000 | SEEE | N | 01.01.13 | 31.3.15 | C |
Source: CBRN portal and CRIS.
Annex VII
Information contained or not in the portal
Source: European Court of Auditors.
Abbreviations and acronyms
AAF: African Atlantic Façade
CBRN: Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CA: Central Asia
DG DEVCO: Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
ECA: Eastern and Central Africa
DG ECHO: Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EEAS: European External Action Service
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
IcSP: Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
INTCEN: EU Intelligence and Situation Centre
JRC: Joint Research Centre
MIE: Middle East
NAP: National action plan
NAQ: Needs assessment questionnaire
NAS: North Africa and Sahel
DG NEAR: Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
NFP: National focal point
SEA: South East Asia
SEEE: South East and Eastern Europe
UNICRI: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
Endnotes
1 Other actions exist such as the reinforcement of export control systems in dual use items (CBRN material with both civilian and military applications) and the redirection of scientists having dual use technology knowledge.
2 COM(2017) 610 final of 18 October 2017 “Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks”.
3 For instance the UNSCR 1540 resolution, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty.
4 Pool Reinsurance Company. Terrorism threat and mitigation report. August-December 2016. Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017.
5 Council conclusions on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan. Doc 15505/1/09 REV 1, 12 November 2009.
COM(2014) 247 final “Communication on a new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks”.
COM(2017) 610 final.
6 Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020, 10 June 2015, document 9798/15.
Council conclusions on European Court of Auditors’ special report 17/2014 “Can the EU’s Centres of Excellence initiative contribute effectively to mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks from outside the EU?” 26 October 2015, document 13279/15.
Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016 EU-NATO joint declaration.
Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-terrorism. Document 10384/17, 19 June 2017.
7 European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2015 on the Court of Auditors’ special reports in the context of the 2013 Commission discharge. Document P8_TA(2015)0119.
European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2015 on the European Agenda on Security. P8_TA(2015)0269.
European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. P8_TA(2016)0440.
8 SWD(2017) 278 final “Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy, accompanying the document: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council – Ninth progress report towards an effective and genuine Security Union.
9 Shared Vision, Common action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016.
10 Annual Action Programme 2017 for Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace: Action document for mitigation of and preparedness against risks related to CBRN materials or agents.
11 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace (OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 1).
12 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020. Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 (Annex).
13 Pilot projects and planning were financed under the 2009 Annual Action Programme for the mitigation of and preparedness against risks related to CBRN materials or agents.
14 The South East and Eastern Europe and Middle East regional secretariats.
15 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
16 Ethiopia, Kuwait, Pakistan and Sierra Leone joined the Initiative in 2017 and Mongolia joined in March 2018.
17 Kazakhstan has expressed an interest to join.
18 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2017.
19 Partner countries (the national team) identify the needs specific to their country and discuss at regional level the actions that could take place to address common CBRN risks and threats.
20 SWD(2017) 278 final PART 1/2, p. 13.
21 Council conclusions on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan. Doc 15505/1/09 REV 1, 12 November 2009.
22 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014.
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) – Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020.
23 By analogy, 124 actions were required from EU Member States regarding prevention, detection, preparedness and response in the first CBRN Action Plan.
24 CBRN national teams coordinate the work and share information in their countries among institutions like ministries, agencies and research and educational facilities involved at various levels in CBRN risk mitigation.
25 For example, contact points for INTERPOL, the World Health Organisation, the UN Security Council 1540 Committee, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters, etc.
26 The regional secretariat consists of one head of secretariat and one UNICRI regional coordinator.
27 One on-site expert covers two regions: North Africa Sahel and the Middle East.
28 World Health Organization, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, Interpol and the United Nations Security Council.
29 The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative, the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Biological Weapons Convention.
30 Our audit scope extended to and included project 60. However, for this calculation we also took into account all projects up to project 66. The on-site technical assistance projects have been excluded.
31 Excluding on-site technical assistance and equipment delivery contracts.
32 The transportation of dangerous goods, and food safety.
33 Tabletop exercises comprise of a discussion among participants to identify and propose response actions. The field exercises test the operational capabilities to respond to a CBRN incident.
34 For example, projects 4, 9, 17, 21, 22, 23, 33, 34, 42, 44, 46 and 47.
35 The United Arab Emirates hosted the event, with the participation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Kingdom of Morocco, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Bahrain.
36 The IcSP long-term regional cooperation officer post allocated to Amman has been transferred to DG NEAR.
37 Such as counter-terrorism, the protection of critical infrastructure and the fight against illicit trafficking.
38 DG DEVCO, the EEAS, the on-site expert, UNICRI and the Governance Team.
39 For almost 70 % of the projects.
40 For example: project 6 final evaluation recommended to “improve the management of time and financial resources. If resources are insufficient, identify this early on to project oversight”. Project 22 ex-post evaluation recommended to “broaden the definitions of the emergency response disciplines to include a broader base of stakeholders, to include medical providers”.
Event | Date |
---|---|
Adoption of Audit Planning Memorandum (APM) / Start of audit | 25.4.2017 |
Official sending of draft report to the Commission and the European External Action Service | 2.3.2018 |
Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure | 24.4.2018 |
Official replies of the Commission and the EEAS received in all languages | 25.5.2018 |
Audit team
The ECA's special reports set out the results of its audits of EU policies and programmes, or of management-related topics from specific budgetary areas. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and public interest.
This performance audit was carried out by Audit Chamber III External actions/Security and justice. Mr Karel Pinxten, was Dean of the Chamber and Reporting Member at the time of adoption of the audit report. After the expiry of his term of office on 30 April 2018, Mrs Bettina Jakobsen took over as Reporting Member and Dean of the Chamber. The audit team was composed of Sabine Hiernaux-Fritsch, Principal Manager; Aurelia Petliza, Head of Task; Michiel Sweerts and Dirk Neumeister, Auditors. Hannah Critoph provided linguistic support.
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018
ISBN 978-92-872-4673-8 | ISSN 1977-5679 | doi:10.2865/75372 | QJ-AB-18-011-EN-N | |
HTML | ISBN 978-92-872-6706-1 | ISSN 1977-5679 | doi:10.2865/635765 | QJ-AB-18-011-EN-Q |
© European Union, 2018.
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