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'Nice umbrella, but let me hold it… at least a little bit, or at times too'
Explaining the security strategy of client states under the extended nuclear umbrella
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How do countries ensure their protection when relying on extended deterrence commitments? Why do some, like the United Kingdom or France, develop their own nuclear forces, whereas others pursue nuclear capabilities without building weapons, while yet others that do cross the proliferation threshold do not acknowledge or give evidence of their arsenal? Despite the inherent credibility problem in extended deterrence and the real-world problems this creates, existing scholarship has largely failed to answer or even dedicate significant attention to these pressing questions of world politics. This dissertation aspires to fill the gap. To answer these questions, I first develop a typology of the distinct strategies client states use to enhance their security under extended deterrence. As strategic actors in their own right, client states adopt one of four security behaviors: nuclear exploration, where they evaluate whether to pursue nuclear weapons and assess their technological capacity; nuclear hedging, using their nuclear programs to pressure the patron for stronger security commitments; nuclear opacity, developing undeclared nuclear capabilities to compel patron intervention during severe security crises; and nuclear independence, leveraging the patron’s nuclear shield to build independent arsenals. Second, I formulate a theoretical framework to explain why different client states adopt different strategic responses at different times. The theoretical framework is structured as a decision tree addressing three sequential questions. The first operates at the international level, while the second and third delve into the internal dynamics of the state. First, does the client state face a significant external threat to its security? If not, the state is likely to adopt a strategy of nuclear exploration. Second, is there strong domestic opposition—either at the elite and/or popular level—to active nuclear weapons development? States facing such opposition typically pursue nuclear hedging. Third, what are the domestic distributional consequences of nuclear weaponization? States anticipating steep domestic costs for overt non-compliance with the international non-proliferation regime will opt for nuclear opacity. In contrast, those less constrained by non-proliferation pressures are more likely to choose nuclear independence. Finally, I test the theoretical framework through three case studies: West Germany (1945-1960), the People’s Republic of China (1949-1964), and Israel (1948-1967).
- Published:
- Corporate author(s): European University Institute
- Personal author(s): Pietzner, Stephan
- Themes: Military structures
- Subject: China , comparative study , contemporary history , deterrent , geopolitics , Germany , international relations , international security , Israel , strategic defence , thesis , trends of opinion , weapon of mass destruction
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| ISSN | ISBN | DOI 10.2870/8321425 | Catalogue number QM-01-25-079-EN-N |
- Released on EU publications website:
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